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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1631
___________
LENELLE GRAY,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01212)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 20, 2010
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 30, 2010)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Lenelle Gray, a federal inmate, appeals pro se from an order dismissing the motion
he filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for lack of jurisdiction.  We
will summarily affirm.
     Gray is an inmate at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, within1
the jurisdiction of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
2
I.  
In September 2005, Lenelle Gray was convicted in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio of two counts of possession with intent to distribute 
crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and one count of using a firearm in a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  (See N.D. Ohio Crim.
No. 05-00143).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of conviction and sentence.  In July 2009, Gray filed a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court dismissed the
petition as time-barred, and the Sixth Circuit subsequently denied Gray’s application for a
certificate of appealability.  
In June 2009, Gray filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure
60(b) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the
district of confinement.   In it he argued that the United States lacked “territorial and1
subject matter jurisdiction” over his alleged criminal activities.  The Magistrate Judge
concluded that Gray’s motion was in fact a challenge to his conviction and sentence. 
Because Rule 60(b) is not the proper vehicle for a federal prisoner to challenge his
criminal conviction or sentence, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Gray’s motion
be construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See Okereke
     The Magistrate Judge further recommended that the action be transferred to the2
Northern District of Ohio, because a § 2255 motion must be filed in the sentencing court. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
     At the time the District Court issued this order it was evidently unaware that Gray had3
already filed a § 2255 motion in the Northern District of Ohio, and was now barred from
filing another without authorization of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2255(h); 2244.  
3
v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their
convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution.”) (citations
omitted).   2
Gray objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),
arguing that he should be allowed to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 instead of § 2255. 
In light of Gray’s objections, the District Court granted Gray leave to withdraw or amend
his filing pursuant to United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1999).  The
District Court specifically ordered that Gray may not proceed pursuant to Rule 60(b), but
provided Gray with a “notice of election” form that offered Gray three alternatives.  He
could choose to: (1) have his motion ruled on as filed; (2) have his motion re-
characterized as a § 2255 motion and heard as such, but in that event he would lose his
ability to file a second or successive motion absent certification by the court of appeals; or
(3) withdraw his motion and file one all-inclusive § 2255 motion within the one-year
statute of limitations period prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”).     3
4On the “notice of election” form, Gray elected to have the court rule on his motion
as filed.  However, Gray also submitted a letter motion seeking that the court treat his
filing as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because § 2255 had been rendered inadequate
and ineffective by the running of its statute of limitations.  He further stated that he
understood a § 2241 petition to be the “appropriate vehicle” to challenge his conviction
because (1) there had been a fundamental miscarriage of justice, (2) he is actually
innocent of the crime he has been convicted of, and (3) constitutional errors at trial
“caused the conviction.”  (Mot.  of Request and Recommendation Accompanying Notice
of Election 1.)   
Upon review of the record, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Gray failed to
make the requisite showing that § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention, and recommended that his petition be dismissed.  Gray objected that the
Court had not honored his notice of election because it had not ruled on his motion as
filed, which was as a motion under Rule 60(b).  The District Court adopted the R&R over
Gray’s objection and dismissed the petition.  Gray timely appealed.  In support of his
appeal, he argues that the District Court should have ruled on his filing as a motion under
Rule 60(b).  He further contends that a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction can be
brought at anytime, and “specifically challenged under Rule 60(b).”  (Appellant’s Resp.
1).     
     To the extent that Gray’s motion sought reconsideration of the denial of his § 22554
motion, he should have filed it in the sentencing court.  
5
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s legal conclusions, and we apply a clearly erroneous standard
to the court’s factual findings.  Rios v. Wiley, 201 F. 3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Gray
cannot proceed with his claim under Rule 60(b) or under § 2241.  Rule 60(b) cannot be
used as an independent means to relieve a defendant of a judgment in a criminal case,
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to criminal cases.  Thus,
the District Court’s refusal to consider Gray’s motion under Rule 60(b) was proper.    4
The appropriate vehicle for a criminal defendant seeking to challenge his or her
conviction or sentence is a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Okereke v. United States,
307 F. 3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  A prisoner can raise such a challenge via 28 U.S.C. §
2241 only upon showing that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d
536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  In his Motion of Request and Recommendation Accompanying
Notice of Election, Gray asserted that § 2255 was inadequate and ineffective because he
could not comply with the statute of limitations applicable under AEDPA.  He also
6argued that he should be permitted to proceed under § 2241 because he is actually
innocent and because there were constitutional errors at trial that resulted in a miscarriage
of justice.  
However, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective “merely because the sentencing
court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner
in unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.” 
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  Indeed, we have held that the safety valve provided under §
2255 applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute
under which the petitioner was convicted makes the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. 
See e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).  Gray makes no allegation of
an intervening change in law, and his unsupported allegations of innocence and
constitutional error do not demonstrate that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.  We agree with the District Court that Gray cannot proceed under
§ 2241.  As he has already filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion, his claims should have
been brought in an application to filed a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. §§
2255(h); 2244.    
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order to the District Court
dismissing Gray’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. 
